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(forthcoming in Synthese) 
 
KNOWLEDGE AND COGNITIVE INTEGRATION 
 
S. Orestis Palermos 
 
University of Edinburgh 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: Cognitive integration is a defining yet overlooked feature of our 
intellect that may nevertheless have substantial effects on the process of 
knowledge-acquisition. To bring those effects to the fore, I explore the topic of 
cognitive integration both from the perspective of virtue reliabilism within 
externalist epistemology and the perspective of extended cognition within 
externalist philosophy of mind and cognitive science. On the basis of this 
interdisciplinary focus, I argue that cognitive integration can provide a 
minimalist yet adequate epistemic norm of subjective justification: so long as 
the agent’s belief-forming process has been integrated in his cognitive 
character, the agent can be justified in holding the resulting beliefs merely by 
lacking any doubts there was something wrong in the way he arrived at them. 
Moreover, since both externalist philosophy of mind and externalist 
epistemology treat the process of cognitive integration in the same way, we 
can claim that epistemic cognitive characters may extend beyond our 
organismic cognitive capacities to the artifacts we employ or even to other 
agents we interact with. This move is not only necessary for accounting for 
advanced cases of knowledge that is the product of the operation of epistemic 
artifacts or the interactive activity of research teams, but it can further lead to 
interesting ramifications both for social epistemology and philosophy of 
science.     
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Cognitive integration is an overlooked yet defining feature of our intellect. It 
is the reason why, in contrast to mere stimulus-response automata, we 
entertain advanced beliefs in an epistemically responsible way, and why we 
can do so even in the complete absence of any reasons to back those beliefs 
up. 
 Nevertheless, within philosophy of mind and cognitive science, it is 
only recently that the topic of cognitive integration was brought into focus. 
This recent change of focus, however, has not been and is still not guided by 
an attempt to understand how our complex brain capacities intertwine with 
each other. Due to Fodor’s (1983) persuasive understanding of our intellectual 
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architecture as modular, in-the-head cognition has largely thought to be for 
the most part domain specific and informationally encapsulated.1 
Consequently, cognitive scientists who take the brain to be the primary 
cognitive explanandum have so far been indisposed to explore and 
understand the phenomenon of cognitive integration.  
 Instead, only after the hypothesis of extended cognition (Clark & 
Chalmers 1998) was proposed (according to which external elements can be 
proper parts of our cognitive systems), did the topic of cognitive integration 
start to attract attention; claiming that artifacts can be parts of an agent’s 
cognitive system presupposes an account of how such external elements can 
be properly integrated into our cognitive loops. Accordingly, over the past 
fifteen years, several attempts have been made to account for the process of 
cognitive integration, most of which rely either on a common-sense 
functionalist understanding of our minds (Clark & Chalmers 1998; Clark 
2010), or on a mathematically inspired approach (Cark 2008; Chemero 2009, 
Palermos 2014) that focuses on the dynamical nature of cognitive processes.  
 Interestingly, however, the topic of cognitive integration has also 
recently emerged within epistemology in reference to the concept of our 
epistemic cognitive characters. Even within epistemology, however, the 
discussion of cognitive integration has not been entirely unrelated to the idea 
of cognitive extension. Admittedly, Greco (2010)—the first to discuss (in 
passing) the idea of cognitive integration in epistemological terms—does not 
commit himself to the possibility of cognitive extension. Both Pritchard (2010) 
and I (Palermos 2011), however, have noted that the notion of the epistemic 
agent’s cognitive character, to which all of the agent’s knowledge-conducive 
belief-forming processes must have been properly integrated, is open to an 
interpretation along the lines suggested by the extended cognition hypothesis. 
However, and despite these few efforts to elucidate the process of cognitive 
integration within epistemology, more needs to be said since the effects of this 
process on knowledge could turn out to be surprisingly substantial.   
 To bring these effects to the fore, we need to approach the idea of 
cognitive integration both from the perspective of virtue reliabilism in 
externalist epistemology (section 2.2) and the perspective of extended 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Despite the influence of Fodor’s work within philosophy of mind and cognitive science, his 
modular understanding of the mind has met some considerable resistance by equally 
influential philosophers. One clear example is the work of Churchland (1979, 1988, 1989).    
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cognition in externalist philosophy of mind (section 2.3). This 
interdisciplinary focus will help us make apparent, in section 2.3, that both 
views treat cognitive integration in essentially the same way—an observation 
that we can then use to bring both perspectives together and thereby 
demonstrate how our epistemic cognitive characters can extend beyond our 
organismic cognitive capacities to the epistemic artifacts we employ.  This 
combination of externalist epistemology with externalist philosophy of mind, 
however, as I will argue in section 3, is not just an available option, but is 
actually necessary for accounting for advanced cases of knowledge whereby 
one’s true believing is the product of the operation of epistemic artifacts. 
Furthermore, this approach can generate interesting ramifications both for 
social epistemology and philosophy of science, wherein the pursuit of 
knowledge has been traditionally associated with the use of artifacts, carefully 
tailored labs, and the combined efforts of epistemic agents working in 
research teams. To start with, however, a few introductory remarks are first in 
order. 
 
2. THE PROCESS OF COGNITIVE INTEGRATION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
“John is sad” is an assertion that can be true or false. In producing this claim, 
of course, perception will always be foundational in a certain way, but in 
order to make, as well as check, the validity of the claim we combine several 
other processes as well. In the background of our minds we have a biological 
as well as a primordial (animalistic) conception of what a human being is and 
we also have a socio-contextual sense of who “John” is; we have a theory of 
mind that enables us to understand other people with thoughts and emotions 
like ours, and we may even need a more personal theory of John’s character: 
John has spent the entire night socializing at the pub and he just made a witty 
joke, but the downwards motion of his eyes accompanied by a melancholic 
smile at the end of his remark are enough to indicate to his close friends that 
his mind is secretly occupied with his recent loss.  
 It is in a sense like this that theories (commonsensical as well as 
scientific ones) have a top-down effect on the bottom-up input we receive 
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from our sense-apparatuses. This overriding effect, known as the theory-
ladeness of observations, has been well-studied both within philosophy of 
science (Kuhn 1962; Hanson 1961; 1969) and philosophy of mind (Churchland 
1979; 1988; 1989; Fodor 1984; 1988), and indicates that perceptual beliefs are 
never ‘purely perceptual’, but they instead emerge out of the cooperation of 
several intellectual capacities operating in tandem.   
 Now, considerations like these indicate that perception (traditionally 
thought of as the most foundational aspect of our belief systems) may not be 
all that basic, and have thereby hinted towards a relativistic picture of 
science—and possibly epistemology as well—whose most prominent 
proponents are thought to be Feyerabend (1975) and Kuhn (1962) (the latter 
quite possibly unjustly though). Fortunately, however, at least as far as the 
theory-ladeness of observation is concerned, recent studies within cognitive 
psychology not only point away from relativism, but they also demonstrate 
how the interaction between our theoretical beliefs and our sensory apparatus 
has a facilitatory effect on the overall process of perception. For example, 
exploring the literature on relevant experiments, Brewer and Lambert (2001) 
concede that “perception is determined by the interaction of top-down theory 
information and bottom-up sensory information” (178, my emphasis):  
 
However, note that in all of the above cases the stimuli were either 
ambiguous, degraded, or required a difficult perceptual judgment. In these 
cases the weak bottom-up information allowed the top-down influences to 
have a strong impact on perceptual experience. It seems likely that strong 
bottom-up information will override top-down information. [...] Thus, the 
topdown/ bottom-up analysis allows one to have cases of theory-laden 
perception, but does not necessarily lead down the slippery slope of 
relativism (ibid.).2 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Similarly, Estany (2001, 208) holds that 
 
the beliefs of the higher or more fundamental level influence how perceptual units 
are interpreted by the lower levels [...] Humans use both types of processes in 
perception because each have characteristic advantages and disadvantages. Thanks 
to top-down processes we can recognize patterns with incomplete or degraded 
information. Moreover, top-down processes make perception faster, but they can 
induce us to make mistakes in a perception by relying on previous knowledge. 
 
Nevertheless, Estany further notes that even though our perceptual systems get guidance 
from higher-order expectations, when attention is caused by the mismatches between 
expectation and reality, the inputs from the arousal system constitute a “reset wave” making 
it possible to avoid arbitrary relativistic errors of perception (Estany 2001, 213).  
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Therefore, we should neither be misguided nor feel intimidated by the 
possibly false impression of relativistic bias that the integration of our 
intellectual capacities into one overarching belief-generating system may have 
initially created. To the contrary, we should focus on the phenomenon of 
cognitive integration because, as we shall see, it actually has a very important 
facilitatory effect on our epistemic standing. In particular, the 
interconnectedness of our cognitive capacities allows us to be subjectively 
justified even if we lack explicit reasons for holding our beliefs. Provided that 
we act in a conscientious mode—i.e., provided we are motivated to believe 
what is true—cognitive integration allows us to trust the deliverances of our 
cognitive abilities by merely lacking any negative reasons against (as opposed 
to possessing positive reasons for) our beliefs. This sense of epistemically 
adequate—yet unreflective—cognitive responsibility can only be achieved by 
agents like us, whose intellectual capacities are appropriately interconnected 
such that in cases where there is something wrong with the way we form our 
beliefs or with the beliefs themselves, we will be able to notice this and 
respond appropriately. Otherwise—if there is nothing wrong—we can go on 
about with our daily activities without questioning our epistemic standing 
with respect to every single of the millions (possibly billions?) of beliefs we 
enjoy in the course of our days. 
 On a first pass, this probably sounds sketchy, but focusing on 
contemporary epistemology should allow us to both understand what this 
unreflective sense of cognitive responsibility amounts to and why it is so 
important.  
 
2.2 Cognitive integration in epistemology 
 
To start with, consider epistemic internalism, which takes an approach to 
epistemic responsibility that is very different from the one suggested here. 
According to traditional forms of internalism, one should always be able, at 
least in principle, to access the reasons that justify one’s beliefs, by reflection 
alone.3 This may initially sound as a reasonable demand, but the problem is 
that it creates serious complications with respect to our perceptual and 
empirical beliefs. Specifically, it poses the requirement that there be necessary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For classical defenses of this view see Chisholm (1977) and Bonjour (1985, ch. 2). See also 
Steup (1999), Pryor (2001, §3), Bonjour (2002), Pappas (2005), and Poston (2008). 
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support relations between one’s empirical and perceptual beliefs and one’s 
evidence for holding them (such that one can be in a position to justify one’s 
empirical and perceptual beliefs by reflection alone). As Hume’s problem of 
induction demonstrates, however, this is impossible. Accordingly, it has been 
traditionally assumed that Hume’s arguments lead to skepticism about our 
empirical knowledge.4  
 Contemplating on the Humean problematic, however, Greco (1999) 
argues that this is too fast. Hume’s arguments should not be directly 
considered as skeptical ones. Instead, the immediate conclusion to be drawn 
from them is that there are no necessary support relations between our 
empirical beliefs and their evidence; that if the evidence for our empirical 
beliefs is reliable, then it is at most contingently reliable. This realization 
alone, however, cannot automatically lead to skepticism. Only after we 
embrace the internalist understanding of knowledge, such that there always 
be necessary support relations between one’s evidence and one’s beliefs do 
we face skepticism.  
 In other words, in order to avoid skepticism about empirical and 
perceptual knowledge, we must allow knowledge to be grounded on 
evidence that is merely contingently reliable, and so we must give up the 
requirement that one’s beliefs should always be internally—i.e., by reflection 
alone—justified. Any adequate epistemology must be able to account for the 
fact that merely contingently reliable evidence can give rise to knowledge (Greco 
1999, 273).  
 Now, in order to accommodate the above realization, contemporary 
epistemologists have put forward process reliabilism; viz., the idea that 
knowledge is true belief that is the product of reliable belief-forming 
processes, where a reliable process is a process that results in a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The problem of induction is well known. We form our beliefs about unobserved matters of 
fact and the external world on the basis of evidence provided by past and present 
observations and sensory appearances, respectively. In order, however, for the support 
relations between our empirical and perceptual beliefs and the evidence offered in their 
support to be necessary, we also need the further assumptions that the future will resemble 
the past and that sensory appearances are reliable indications to reality, respectively. The 
problem, however, is that both of these assumptions rely for their support on what they 
assert. Consequently, given that circular reasoning is invalid, there are no necessary support 
relations between our empirical beliefs and the evidence offered in their support. 
Accordingly, the conclusion that has been traditionally drawn is that our empirical and 
perceptual beliefs cannot amount to knowledge. For more details on a reconstruction of 
Hume’s skepticism along these lines, see (Greco 1999).  
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preponderance of true over false beliefs. Moreover, in direct response to the 
Humean problematic, this approach “denies that one must know that one’s 
evidence is reliable”, by making “de facto reliability the grounds of positive 
epistemic status” (Greco 1999, 284-5). Accordingly, process reliabilism is an 
externalist approach to knowledge, because—contrary to the traditional 
account of knowledge as internally justified true belief—on this view, in order 
to know, one does not need to know, be justified in believing (by reflection 
alone, or any other means), or even believe that one’s beliefs are formed in a 
reliable fashion. So long as one employs an objectively reliable process, one is 
justified in holding the resulting belief.  
 Process reliabilism, therefore, has the resources to overcome the 
Humean skepticism. There are, however, two serious complications with the 
view. The first one is that process reliabilism, as it stands, is too weak a 
condition on knowledge because it allows any reliable belief-forming process 
to count as knowledge-conducive, and this, as we shall see, is intuitively 
incorrect. The second complication is that by making “de facto reliability the 
grounds of positive epistemic status” process reliabilism misses a very 
important dimension of our epistemic nature. While it is true that in order to 
know we do need the way of forming our beliefs to be objectively reliable, 
this sort of objective justification is not sufficient in its own. What we further 
need is that we be subjectively justified in the sense that we must be somehow 
sensitive to the reliability of our evidence.5 Process reliabilism, however, 
ignores this dimension of our epistemically sentient nature altogether, to the 
extent that it has been even criticized that it equates us to mere stimulus-
response automata (Fuller 2012).6 We can better appreciate these two 
problems by taking a look at a few (eccentric, yet informative) examples. 
Consider Hercules first: 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Remember, however, that if, as Hume’s skeptical arguments demonstrate, the relation 
between evidence and belief is not necessary (see also fn. 4), then it is far from obvious how a 
person can be subjectively justified, especially in externalist approaches such as process 
reliabilism. If a condition of ‘subjective sensitivity to the reliability of one’s evidence’ must be 
satisfied, then this should better be accomplished in a way that will not require knowledge of or 
even beliefs about the said reliability (otherwise Hume’s skepticism will strike back).  
6 “Epistemic zombies” would probably be the name that David Chalmers would give to such 
creatures. Given, however, the present discussion I don’t think they could really exist. 
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Hercules (Adapted from Pritchard’s Temp (2009, 48)) 
Hercules tosses a drachma whenever he wants to form a belief about the 
weather outside. If it is heads, he forms the belief that it is sunny; if it is tails 
he believes it is cloudy; and if it balances in between, he believes it is rainy. 
As it happens, Hercules’ way of forming his weather beliefs is perfectly 
reliable, because Zeus, who wants to save Hercules from the embarrassment 
of forming false weather beliefs, has an eye on him; every time he sees 
Hercules tossing the coin arranges the world accordingly.  
 
Hercules’ beliefs are formed in a highly reliable way. So, according to process 
reliabilism, Hercules has knowledge of the weather conditions. Intuitively, 
however, this is incorrect. There is a problem with the direction of fit between 
his beliefs and the facts. In cases of knowledge, we want our beliefs to be true 
because they correspond to the facts, and not because the facts comply with 
our beliefs; when one knows, one’s true beliefs are about the world, not the 
other way around. In Hercules’ case, however, his beliefs are not true because 
they are formed in a way that detects the facts. Instead, he first forms his 
beliefs in an arbitrary way—he makes no efforts to ensure they will come out 
true—and then Zeus takes over so that the facts will comply with Hercules’ 
beliefs. This, however, is not knowledge; it is the ‘luck of the gods’. If one day 
Zeus had a fight with Hera, Hercules’ beliefs would cease coming out true.   
Notice, however, that if Hercules used his cognitive abilities—say by 
taking a look at the sky—to form his weather beliefs, then he would not run 
into any such problems. If he didn’t form his beliefs in an arbitrary way, but 
on the basis of his cognitive abilities, he would not need Zeus to tweak the 
world so that his beliefs could systematically turn out true. If one’s beliefs are 
the product of one’s cognitive abilities, then if they turn out to be true it will 
be because they are sensitive to the facts; the direction of fit will be the correct 
one.   
So, it may be proposed that the way to restrict the reliable belief-
forming processes to those that get the direction of fit correctly—such that 
they can be knowledge-conducive—is to identify them with one’s cognitive 
abilities, or, in other words, with those processes that can be intuitively 
thought of as cognitive ones. But can all prima facie cognitive processes count 
as cognitive abilities and thereby produce knowledge? The answer, as we 
shall now see, must be a negative one, because there are reliable processes 
that we might be inclined to categorize as cognitive ones, but which fail to 
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deliver knowledge, exactly because they disallow the agent to be subjectively 
justified in employing them. Think about the Serendipitous Brain Lesion first: 
 
Serendipitous Brain Lesion (Greco 2010, 149) 
Suppose that S has a rare brain lesion, one effect of which is to reliably cause 
the true belief that one has a brain lesion. Even if the process is perfectly 
reliable, it seems wrong that one can come to have knowledge that one has a 
brain lesion on this basis.  
 
Again, the unfortunate agent’s way of forming his true belief about the brain 
lesion on the basis of his brain lesion is reliable. Process reliabilists, therefore, 
must accept that he can gain knowledge in this way. As Greco claims, 
however, this does not sound correct. Why not? Mainly because the way the 
agent forms his belief is so strange from his point of view that he cannot 
accept he can gain knowledge in this way (Greco 1999, 2010). Accordingly, 
there might be reliable in-the-head processes (such that we may be inclined to 
call them cognitive ones) that we wouldn’t like to claim they are knowledge-
conducive cognitive abilities, because from the agent’s point of view they are 
strange. More precisely, the underlying intuition here is that for a process to 
be eligible to count as a cognitive ability it must not be strange, in the sense 
that it must not be at odds with the rest of the agent’s cognitive system.7 The 
reason is that if the process is strange, then, in light of the rest of his cognitive 
system, the agent will reject both the process and its deliverances despite the 
fact that they are in fact reliable—from the agent’s point of view, they aren’t. 
So, in order for a process to be a candidate for qualifying as a cognitive ability 
such that it can be knowledge-conducive it must not be inconsistent with the 
rest of the agent’s beliefs and his methods of producing them. In other words, 
it must be such that it can become part of, or be integrated into, the rest of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 An anonymous referee points out that strangeness is description-relative. Take vision for 
example. We are all familiar with acquiring knowledge through seeing things. But learning 
about the physiological and neural underpinnings of vision will surely seem strange to some; 
couldn't such a person say "This is really strange, and I don't really see how it works, but, I 
guess, this is how I know the color of my shoes"? I think this is right, but this example 
wouldn’t be problematic for the following two reasons. First, even though the explanation 
may seem ‘strange’ to the agent (in the sense of being difficult to understand) it is not ‘at odds 
with the rest of the agent’s cognitive system’. Second, the requirement that the process not be 
strange does not refer to a reflective-explanatory understanding of the process (as in the 
referee’s example), but to the presence of the process itself. Think about the analogy of a 
strange (i.e., eccentric) person who is nevertheless not a stranger: the requirement that the 
process not be strange allows for the process to be ‘strange’ in the first sense, but not in the 
sense of being a ‘stranger’. I am thankful to the referee for bringing this ambiguity to my 
attention.     
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agent’s cognitive system (Greco 2010, 152). And clearly, this is not the case 
with the serendipitous brain lesion. The process is a cognitive malfunction, 
and even more crucially, its output is so odd that no epistemic agent could 
accept as true. In other words, the serendipitous brain lesion cannot count as 
knowledge-conducive because it is so strange that it cannot become part of 
the rest of the agent’s cognitive system and so cannot count as a cognitive 
ability.8  
 Nevertheless, even a reliable process that is normal enough to become 
part of the agent’s cognitive system cannot yet count as a cognitive ability that 
can produce knowledge. Consider a further example: 
 
Careless Math Student (Greco 2010, 149) 
Suppose that S is taking a math test and adopts a correct algorithm for 
solving a problem. But suppose that S has no understanding that the 
algorithm is the correct one to use for this problem. Rather, S chooses it on a 
whim, but could just as well have chosen one that is incorrect. By hypothesis, 
the algorithm is the right one, and so using it to solve the problem constitutes 
a reliable process. It seems wrong to say that S thereby knows the answer to 
the problem, however. 
  
The careless student’s algorithm for solving the problem is also reliable. But 
again, we cannot attribute knowledge to her. Why not? The reason is that she 
employed the right method on a whim, such that she could have very easily 
employed another, incorrect method. Her reliable process is a fleeting one. It 
is not a habit or a disposition of hers. Given the same circumstances, she 
could have employed an inappropriate method, thereby, ending up with a 
falsehood. If, however, the student had habitually invoked the correct 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 An anonymous referee insists that the brain lesion can yield knowledge, thereby implying 
that process reliabilism is a sufficient condition on knowledge. While it may be possible to 
make the case for the sufficiency of process reliabilism, the orthodox view within mainstream 
epistemology goes against this prospect. For classical rejections of the sufficiency of process 
reliabilism on the basis of thought experiments very similar to the Serendipitous Brain 
Lesion, see Bonjour (1980), Lehrer (1990) and Plantinga (1993b). The main idea is that 
reliability might be necessary for knowledge but what is further required is satisfaction of the 
internalist intuitions with respect to the possession of subjective justification (as we 
mentioned above, one of the problems for process reliabilism is that by making de facto 
reliability the grounds of positive epistemic status, it fails to capture the intuition that, 
somehow, we must also be sensitive to the reliability of our evidence). Internalists, typically 
require the possession of reflectively accessible reasons for said reliability. Here, following 
Greco’s intuitions (1999; 2010, 149-155), we opt for a weaker condition of subjective 
justification according to which the agent must lack beliefs against the reliability of his belief-
forming process, where the process being strange from the agent’s point of view would count 
as just one such defeating belief. For very similar intuitions on how the strangeness of the 
origin of the relevant beliefs acts as a defeater in Bonjour (1980) and Lehrer’s (1990) thought 
experiments see Goldman (1986, 111–112).     
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algorithm when the problems called for it, then we would indeed be inclined 
to claim that she could gain knowledge on its basis. The reason for this is that 
if a process is a disposition or a habit of the agent, then the agent will be able 
to become aware of the circumstances in which it can become unreliable. 
Otherwise, it seems arbitrary that the agent employed it in an appropriate, 
but isolated case, and so cannot gain knowledge on its basis. In other words, a 
reliable process that is normal—such that it can, in principle, become part of 
the rest of one’s cognitive system—won’t be a candidate for qualifying as a 
cognitive ability, unless it is also a disposition or a habit of the agent. Why is 
this so? The intuition is that abilities, in general, are habits or dispositions 
possessed by agents.9 But apart from such intuitions we have also noted that 
in order for a reliable process to count as a cognitive ability it must be such 
that it can become part of (or be integrated into) the rest of the agent’s 
cognitive system. One requirement for this, we have noted, is that the process 
not be strange such that it won’t be inconsistent with the rest of the agent’s 
cognitive system. What is further required, however, is that it also be coherent 
with her cognitive system in the following sense: The agent must be able to 
become aware that the process is unreliable in certain circumstances, because 
this will allow her to non-accidentally endorse its deliverances in the rest of the 
circumstances, even if she lacks any positive beliefs for its reliability. And in the 
absence of any explicit reasons that are accessible through reflection alone—
recall the Humean problematic—the only realistic way for the agent to so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 An anonymous referee is worried that I should not use ‘dispositions’ and ‘habits’ as 
synonyms. Specifically, not all dispositions are habits; someone or something, for example, 
may be disposed to act in a certain way—should the appropriate conditions obtain—even if 
the relevant person or thing has never behaved in that way before. Accordingly, the worry 
further goes, the fact that a cognitive ability is a disposition does not mean it will also be a 
habit. In response, even though it is true that in one sense of the term, ‘dispositions’ are not 
always going to be habits, there is another sense of the term that they are; according to this 
second sense of the term, to claim that cognitive abilities are dispositions means that abilities 
are character traits, or habitual behaviors that the agent tends to exhibit. A strong indication 
that this is how we should understand the dispositional nature of cognitive abilities has to do 
with the fact that abilities can only be acquired and sustained through practice, whereas 
dispositions, in the other meaning of the term, can be possessed by an entity even if they are 
never actually manifested (e.g., a vase may be fragile even if it has never been broken). As we 
shall see below, Greco appears to concur with this understanding of abilities as he claims they 
are the stable traits of the agent’s cognitive character; a behavior can be in character only if it is 
habitually manifested. See also (Greco 2010, 150). I am thankful to the referee for pressing this 
point.         
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become epistemically responsible in employing a process is that it be a 
disposition or habit of hers.10,11  
 So to summarize what we have gathered from the three examples 
above, in cases of knowledge, we want one’s beliefs to be responsive to the 
facts. Accordingly, we claimed that only prima facie cognitive processes can be 
knowledge-conducive, but not all of them will do. The process must be a 
cognitive ability, meaning that the agent will be able to be conscientious and 
thereby subjectively justified in employing it. And in the absence of positive 
reasons (that are accessible through reflection alone) for the reliability of the 
cognitive process, this last condition can be satisfied in a realistic way only if 
the relevant process is a normal disposition or habit of the agent such that it 
can become part of (or be integrated into) the rest of her cognitive system. 
 Notably then, the general idea, which all the above considerations are 
alluding to, is that for a reliable process to be knowledge-conducive it must be 
a cognitive ability. This idea has also appeared in the literature as the ability 
intuition on knowledge and can be summarized by stating that knowledge is belief 
that is true in virtue of cognitive ability.12 Now the end result of the above 
considerations is that they fill in the details of which reliable processes may 
plausibly count as cognitive abilities by demonstrating that it is only normal, 
dispositional or habitual cognitive processes that the agent can be subjectively 
justified in employing (and thereby able to gain knowledge from).  
 Now, building on considerations very similar to the above ones, Greco 
(1999) has proposed a virtue reliabilist account of knowledge, which 
emphasizes that when we assess whether some agent knows, we shouldn’t be 
focusing on the reliability of isolated (cognitive) belief-forming processes, but 
on the reliability of the overall agent, conceived of as a stable, interconnected 
system of such belief-forming processes. 13 It is this interwoven totality of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 I here say ‘the only realistic way’ because we can imagine, for instance, a case of a 
benevolent mentalist who hypnotizes the agent to trust a newly acquired process, and trust it 
only in the appropriate conditions (thereby allowing him to be epistemically responsible in 
employing it), despite the fact that the process is not a disposition of hers.   
11 For further discussion of the above intuitions on the Serendipitous Brain Lesion and 
Careless Math Student cases see (Greco 1999) and (Greco 2010, 149-155). For the discussion of 
similar thought experiments and intuitions see (Bonjour 1980), (Goldman 1986), (Lehrer 
1990), and (Pantinga 1993b). 
12 The idea that knowledge must be grounded in cognitive abilities can be traced back to the 
writings of Sosa (1988; 1993) and Plantinga (1993a). For more recent approaches to this 
intuition, see Greco (1999; 2004; 2007) and Pritchard (2009; forthcoming; 2010a; 2010b).    
13 Any theory of knowledge that places in its center the ability intuition on knowledge will 
fall under the general trend of Virtue Reliabilism (abilities are normally understood as virtues 
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cognitive abilities that give rise to one’s sense of epistemic self (or in Greco’s 
terms to one’s ‘cognitive character’), and which should be the focus of our 
epistemic assessment.  
 To make apparent the motivation for this change of epistemic focus, 
remember that in order to avoid the Humean problematic we must 
accommodate subjective justification in a way that does not involve 
knowledge or even beliefs about reliability. At this point, Greco (1999, 289) 
suggests that a promising strategy for doing so is to claim that “a belief p is 
subjectively justified for a person S (in the sense relevant for having 
knowledge) if and only if S’s believing p is grounded in the cognitive 
dispositions that S manifests when S is thinking conscientiously” (i.e., when S 
is motivated to believe what is true). In this way, the agent will employ his 
reliable cognitive processes only in circumstances that have not been 
problematic in the past, and he will be able to do so without even having any 
beliefs about their reliability.14 Greco, then, goes on to further claim that the 
dispositions/habits that a person manifests when she is thinking 
conscientiously intertwine with each other and give rise to what we may call 
one’s cognitive character (Greco 1999, 290). So, overall, “a belief p has a positive 
epistemic status for a person S just in case S’s believing p results from the 
stable and reliable dispositions that make up S’s cognitive character” (ibid., 
287-8).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and vice versa). To accentuate the features of his account, Greco calls his view Agent 
Reliabilism, but it is clearly a version of Virtue Reliabilism—one that emphasizes the 
importance of the overall agent in the manifestation of the relevant intellectual virtues. For 
alternative, robust as well as weaker formulations of Virtue Reliabilism see Sosa (1993; 2007) 
and Pritchard (forthcoming; 2010a; 2010b), respectively.  
14 The fact that people manifest highly specific, finely tuned dispositions to form their beliefs 
in certain ways but not in others amounts to an implicit awareness of the reliability of those 
dispositions.  
 
 For example suppose that it seems visually to a person that a cat is sleeping on the 
couch, and on this basis she believes that there is a sleeping cat on the couch. Suppose 
also that this belief manifests a disposition that the person has, to trust this sort of 
experience under these sorts of conditions, when motivated to believe the truth. 
Now, suppose that much less clearly, it seems visually to the person that a mouse has 
run across the floor. Not being disposed to trust this kind of fleeting experience, the 
person refrains from believing until further evidence comes in. The fact that the 
person, properly motivated, is disposed to trust one kind of experience but not the 
other, constitutes sensitivity on her part that the former is reliable. There is a clear 
sense in which she takes the former experience to be adequate to her goal of believing 
the truth, and takes the latter experience not to be. And this is so even if she has no 
beliefs about her goals, her reliability, or her experience (Greco 1999, 290 ) . 
       
A similar argument can be found in (Sosa 1993, 60-63). 
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In this way, Greco can do away both with strange and fleeting 
processes. Strange processes cannot be part of the agent’s cognitive character 
because they are not the kind of processes that a conscientious agent would 
employ. Fleeting processes are also excluded. First, because they are not 
dispositions or habits—so they cannot really count as character traits. And, 
second (I may add), because, in the absence of reasons to believe that the 
relevant process is reliable, it is only dispositions or habits that one can 
become aware they are unreliable in certain circumstances and, so—without 
relying on any beliefs about their reliability—use them conscientiously in the 
rest of the circumstances.15  
 So in order to gain knowledge on the basis of a process the agent must 
be able to employ a conscientious attitude towards that process. And in order 
for that to be the case, the relevant process must be a cognitive ability of the 
agent, meaning that it must have been integrated into the agent’s cognitive 
character. Now, despite the previous points on the importance of the 
normality and dispositionality of the relevant process in order for it to count 
as a genuine part of one’s cognitive character, Greco attempts to further 
accentuate and shed some light on the integrated nature of our cognitive 
characters by noting that the process of “cognitive integration is a function of 
cooperation and interaction, or cooperative interaction with other aspects of 
the cognitive system” (2010, 152). So, how exactly should we think about the 
required conditions for a process to count as knowledge-conducive?  
 In general, every knowledge-conducive process must be a cognitive 
ability such that the agent will be subjectively justified in employing it, which 
requires that the process be integrated into the agent’s cognitive character by 
cooperatively interacting with it. Accordingly, we may say that the only 
necessary and sufficient condition for a process to count as knowledge-
conducive is that it cooperatively interacts with the rest of the agent’s 
cognitive character. Now, apparently, this makes the normality and 
dispositionality criteria seem redundant—which strictly speaking they are—
but they may still have a role to play; normality and dispositionality of the 
relevant process seem to be practical preconditions for the agent to be able to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Apart from the example given in the previous footnote, Greco has not attempted to provide 
an account of how the process of subjective justification works. I assume, however, that he 
wouldn’t reject this falsificationist approach, as I cannot see how else subjective justification 
could be accommodated in an externalist way. 
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cooperatively interact with it. The extent, however, to which each one of these 
criteria may need to be satisfied will differ from case to case. An agent, for 
example, may be subjectively justified in employing a process in the 
appropriate conditions not because it is a normal disposition of hers but 
because a benevolent mentalist hypnotized her to do so.  In most realistic 
cases, however, normality and dispositionality will still have a significant 
guiding effect. The decisive effect of cognitive integration, however—on the 
basis of which the agent can be conscientious and thereby subjectively 
justified—will only be ensured if the agent’s cognitive character mutually 
interacts with the relevant process. So, all we need to accept that a process is 
knowledge-conducive is that it be integrated into the agent’s cognitive 
character by cooperatively interacting with it. On the basis of this mutual 
interaction with the rest of his cognitive system the agent will be able to 
employ the relevant process conscientiously by merely lacking any beliefs 
that it is unreliable (at least not in the circumstances in which he employs it), 
or if the employment is involuntary, conscientiously accept its deliverances 
when he lacks any beliefs that the conditions that gave rise to them were 
unreliable.  
 Moreover, as we saw previously in the discussion of the three 
examples, this process of cognitive integration gives rise to a coherentist effect 
both on the level of processes (how the beliefs are generated) and on the level 
of content (how the beliefs themselves combine). Also, it ensures that at least 
directly related belief-generating mechanisms and their resulting beliefs will 
be consistent.  
Overall then, the epistemic importance of cognitive integration is that it 
allows epistemic agents to satisfy the condition of subjective justification in a 
minimalist way, which is nevertheless sufficient for acquiring knowledge 
even if one cannot—not even in principle—offer any explicit reasons in favor 
of one’s beliefs. Stated explicitly, this minimalist condition of subjective 
justification is that conscientious epistemic agents ought to accept the 
deliverances of, and employ their cognitive abilities, only when they lack any 
doubts that they are unreliable, given the conditions they employ them in.16 In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 As an anonymous referee has pointed out I should make clear that this condition should be 
restricted to reliable processes.  We should not allow, for example, to an agent who forms his 
beliefs on the basis of astronomical considerations or wishful thinking to count as subjectively 
justified merely by lacking any doubts about the unreliability of his belief-forming processes. 
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other words, cognitive integration allows epistemic agents to be conscientious 
in the sense that in cases where there is something wrong with the way they 
form their beliefs they will be able to spot this and respond appropriately. 
Otherwise, they can go on formulating their beliefs, without worrying 
whether they can actually offer reasons for every single one of them or for 
their reasons for holding them.17  
 
2.3. Cognitive integration in epistemology and philosophy of mind 
 
In the introduction, I mentioned that the topic of cognitive integration has 
been explored in epistemology also in reference to the possibility of cognitive 
extension. The general idea is that the knowledge-conducive cognitive 
abilities and their relation to one’s cognitive character as discussed within 
virtue epistemology is particularly apt for an interpretation along the lines 
suggested by the hypothesis of extended cognition. To make this clear it 
should be helpful to repeat, for the last time, what are the important features 
of a knowledge-conducive belief-forming process.  
 In general, the process must be a cognitive ability. In order for that to 
be the case the process must be a cognitive process. This will guarantee the 
correct direction of fit between the belief and the fact. Also, we want the 
belief-forming process to be objectively reliable, where a reliable process is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Given, however, that the epistemic agent must be conscientious (i.e., motivated to believe 
what is true) this qualification is actually redundant. If the agent is motivated to believe what 
is true, he will not employ astronomical considerations or wishful thinking because he will 
have noticed that such processes were notably unreliable in the past. For the same reason, 
they won’t even be parts of his (conscientious) cognitive character.  
17 Further to footnotes 14 and 15, in providing this sort of account of subjective justification, I 
have relied for the most part on phenomenological intuitions about how we seem to go about 
our beliefs in everyday life. Nevertheless, such phenomenological intuitions seem to already 
entertain a certain degree of scientific support. Specifically, within cognitive psychology, 
there have been several studies indicating that subjects engage in analytic reasoning only 
when they experience the metacognitive effect of the lack of ‘fluency’: 
  
 “Fluency is not a cognitive operation in and of itself but, rather, a feeling of ease 
 associated with a cognitive operation, it can be generated by nearly any form of 
 thinking. If a percept is blurry, we are aware that it was hard to see. If a word is 
 phonemically irregular, we recognize the challenge in processing it. We know 
 whether we had to struggle to bring a memory to mind and whether we had a hard 
 or easy time solving a riddle. Because the metacognitive experience of fluency can be 
 generated by so many cognitive processes and is nearly effortless to access, it can 
 serve as a cue toward judgments in virtually any situation”. (Oppenheimer 
 forthcoming). 
For an overview on the metacognitive feeling of fluency see (Oppenheimer forthcoming), 
(Alter & Oppenheimer 2007) and (Unkelbach & Greifeneder 2013).    
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one that tends to produce true rather than false beliefs. Recall, however, that 
according to reliabilism, the agent does not need his evidence to be 
necessarily reliable, such that he can be internally justified in holding his 
belief; if forming a belief on a certain kind of evidence constitutes a reliable 
belief-forming process, it does not matter that one’s evidence is only 
contingently reliable; the agent, on his part, does not need to know or even 
have any beliefs about the reliability of his way of forming beliefs. Instead, the 
agent can be subjectively justified simply by forming his belief on the basis of 
a process that is integrated into his cognitive character, which he employs 
when he is thinking conscientiously. Now, in order for a process to be a 
candidate for inclusion to the agent’s conscientious cognitive character, we 
noted that it will probably have to be neither strange nor fleeting. In most 
realistic scenarios the process (1) will have to be normal so that the agent 
won’t reject it when conscientious and (2) will have to be a disposition or a 
habit of the agent, because (barring scenarios such as the mentalist case) it is 
only dispositions or habits that one can become aware they are unreliable in 
certain circumstances, and so—without relying on any beliefs about their 
reliability—be able to employ them conscientiously in the rest of the 
circumstances. As we further noted, however, even though normality and 
dispositionality will, in most cases, be practical preconditions, they are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for a process to count as integrated into the agent’s 
cognitive character. Instead, the only thing that is required is that the process 
be integrated into the agent’s cognitive character, by engaging in cooperative 
interaction with the rest of the agent’s cognitive system. Accordingly, no 
matter what the practical preconditions for this interactive process to be 
achieved are, once it is in place, it will guarantee both that the relevant belief-
forming process is a cognitive process, and that it is indeed part of the agent’s 
cognitive character such that he can be conscientious in employing it. So 
putting all the above points together: a belief-forming process counts as a 
cognitive ability and thereby as knowledge-conducive if and only if it is a 
reliable belief-forming process that is integrated into the agent’s cognitive 
character, on the basis of a process of cooperative interaction with it.18  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Many externalist epistemologists would reject the above biconditional on the grounds that 
in order for a process to be knowledge-conducive it should also be safe (where a safe process 
is one that could not have easily being wrong). Consider for example Anti-Luck Virtue 
Epistemology: S knows that p if and only if S’s safe belief that p is the product of her relevant cognitive 
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 Now to see why we might get the impression of a close fit between 
virtue epistemology and the hypothesis of extended cognition, here are three 
common-sense functionalist criteria, which Clark (2010) suggests must be 
satisfied by non-biological candidates in order to be included into an 
individual’s cognitive system: 
 
1) “That the process be reliably available and typically invoked”.  
 
That is, the agent should habitually and easily invoke the external resource. In 
other words, its employment must be a disposition/habit of the agent’s 
overall cognitive mechanism. 	  
2) “That any information thus retrieved be more-or-less 
automatically endorsed. It should not usually be subject to critical 
scrutiny. […] It should be deemed about as trustworthy as 
something retrieved clearly from biological memory”.  
 
That is, the information in the resource must be regarded as normal and 
reliable and not be necessarily reliable. It suffices that its employment result 
into an equally trustworthy belief-forming process as the one of forming 
beliefs on the basis of one’s own biological memory.19  
At this point, however, one might object that being reliable is not the 
same as being trustworthy (i.e., being regarded as reliable). But, in response, 
notice first that Clark identifies the notion of trustworthiness of a process with 
the idea of being “more-or-less automatically endorsed” or in other words 
“not usually subject to critical scrutiny”. That is, the target process must not 
have been (for the most part) problematic in the past. Moreover, the processes 
under consideration are also supposed to be cognitive dispositions or habits 
of the agent that he has repeatedly employed in the past, and so had they 
been problematic the agent would have noticed that and responded 
appropriately. Accordingly, a trustworthy belief-forming process in Clark’s 
account, will be one that tends to produce true rather than false beliefs, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
abilities (such that her safe cognitive success is to a significant degree creditable to her cognitive 
agency) (Pritchard forthcoming, 20). Again, in (Pritchard 2010a, 76) we can read: “ knowledge is 
safe belief that arises out of the reliable cognitive traits that make up one’s cognitive 
character, such that one’s cognitive success is to a significant degree creditable to one’s 
cognitive character”. For a defense of the claim that the safety condition is not necessary for 
virtue reliabilism to account for knowledge see (Palermos forthcoming) 
19 That is, the process does not need to be, due to underlying logical or quasi-logical relations, 
100% reliable. Notice that memory is supposed to be reliable even though one may 
misremember. 
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is to say that it will be objectively reliable in the virtue reliabilist’s sense. What 
the agent will deem reliable will be that which is objectively reliable, i.e., that 
which has not been (for the most part) problematic in the past. 
Furthermore, notice this negative way of deeming processes reliable 
with which Clark concurs (i.e., that a trustworthy process is one that is not 
usually subject to critical scrutiny such that it is more-or-less automatically 
endorsed). What this means is that the agent does not need to have any beliefs 
about why or whether his belief-forming process is trustworthy; it suffices 
that it has not repeatedly caught his negative attention in the past. This is in 
good agreement with the proposed minimalist understanding of subjective 
justification according to which one does not need to rely on any beliefs but 
simply on one’s motivation to believe the truth. For example, one will trust 
one’s vision in appropriate circumstances, just because vision has not been 
notably problematic in the past (in those circumstances). By being motivated 
to believe the truth one will thereby employ the belief-forming process that 
has not in the past (notably) failed to be conducive towards that end, and 
crucially, one will do so without even thinking about it.  
 
3) “That information contained in the resource should be easily 
accessible as and when required”.  
 
That is, the agent must be able to employ it as if it was part of his organismic 
cognitive mechanism. In other words, the resource must be integrated into the 
agent’s overall cognitive mechanism.  
So we see that the same features of a process that epistemologists deem 
important in order for a process to be knowledge-conducive are required by a 
common-sense functionalist understanding of cognition in order for a process 
to count as part of one’s mind. This is a promising observation. 
Notice, however, that even if there were no such close fit between these 
broad features, we would still be able to show that the two theories are 
essentially connected. The reason, as we noted before, is that some of the 
above features (e.g., normality and dispositionality of the process) may be 
conducive towards the process being knowledge-conducive, but they are 
neither necessary nor sufficient for that end. Instead, the only requirement is 
that the process be integrated into the agent’s cognitive character.  
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Now in relation to this, philosophy of cognitive science has recently 
started shifting its focus away from the above common-sense functionalist 
criteria for including an external resource into one’s cognitive system. Instead, 
Chemero (2009), Froese et al. (2013) and I (Palermos 2014) have suggested that 
the only requirement for an external element to count as a constitutive part of 
the agent’s cognitive system is that it be non-linearly related to the rest of the 
agent’s cognitive system. The motivation for this is that, according to 
dynamical systems theory, these non-linear relations give rise to an overall 
non-decomposable system that consists of all the contributing parts. And two 
reasons for postulating the overall system are that these non-linear 
interactions (1) give rise to new systemic properties that belong only to the 
overall system and to none of the contributing systems alone (therefore we 
have to postulate the overall extended system) and (2) prevent us from 
decomposing the two systems in terms of distinct inputs and outputs from 
the one subsystem to the other (therefore we cannot but postulate the overall 
system).20 What is even more interesting to our present purposes, however, is 
that just as Greco holds that cognitive integration is a matter of interaction 
and cooperation between cognitive processes, so those non-linear relations 
that allow us to talk about integration within philosophy of mind and 
cognitive science emerge only on the basis of cooperative feedback loops between 
the contributing elements of the overall system. 
Therefore both in epistemology and philosophy of mind and cognitive 
science the same criterion (cooperative interaction with the rest of the agent’s 
cognitive system) is required for a process to be integrated into an agent’s 
cognitive system and thereby count as knowledge-conducive. This, however, 
should not really come as a surprise. Given that virtue reliabilism holds that 
knowledge must be the product of cognitive ability (however that ability may 
be realized) and that the hypothesis of extended cognition sets out to reveal 
which processes can count as cognitive abilities (wherever they may be 
located), this close fit between the two theories seems to be as it should be.  
The conclusion that follows, then, is that there is no principled 
theoretical bar disallowing extended belief-forming processes from counting 
as knowledge-conducive cognitive abilities. Given that virtue reliabilism 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 For a detailed explanation of why the existence of non-linear relations that arise out of the 
mutual interactions between agents and their artifacts ensures the existence of extended 
cognitive systems see (Palermos 2014).  
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makes no specifications as to whether knowledge-conducive cognitive 
abilities should be located within the agent’s head, then, provided that the 
condition of cognitive integration is met, the epistemic agent may extend his 
knowledge-conducive cognitive character beyond his organismic cognitive 
abilities by incorporating epistemic artifacts to it.  
 
3. IS THIS NECESSARY FOR EPISTEMOLOGY AND WHAT ARE THE 
RAMIFICATIONS? 
 
Obviously, the possibility of knowledge-conducive cognitive characters that 
may nevertheless be extended beyond our organismic cognitive capacities can 
generate interesting ramifications both for traditional and social 
epistemology, which may allow us to think about knowledge in new ways.  
Focusing, however, on the integrated nature of our extendable cognitive 
characters may not only be important for moving forward, but also necessary 
for accounting for knowledge as we already think about it.  
 According to Greco (1999, 287), in addition to one’s organismic 
cognitive abilities of the brain/central nervous system, a person’s cognitive 
character may also consist of “acquired skills of perception and acquired 
methods of inquiry including those involving highly specialized training or 
even advanced technology”. The reason for this move is that we need to 
account for advanced cases of knowledge where one’s believing the truth is 
the product of the operation of epistemic artifacts such as telescopes, 
microscopes, tactile visual substitution systems and so on.21 The problem, 
however, is that in the traditional conception, cognition takes place strictly 
within the agent’s head and so artifacts cannot be parts of one’s cognitive 
character.  
 One way to sidestep this problem for virtue reliabilism, could be to 
claim that, in such cases, it is merely the agent’s training and skill of using the 
artifact, as mirrored in the agent’s neural/bodily architecture, that is the most 
salient factor in the causal explanation of the agent’s cognitive success (i.e., 
believing the truth). Notice, however, that when an agent employs an 
epistemic tool, his true belief arises as the product of the interaction between 
his internal processes and the artifact. According to dynamical systems 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See Bach-y-Rita and Kercel (2003) for a recent review on tactile visual substitution systems. 
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theory, then, the cognitive process that allows the agent to detect the truth is 
not merely ‘aided’ or ‘assisted’ by the artifact but is, instead, constituted by it 
as it arises out of the ongoing mutual interaction between the agent and the 
artifact.22 Therefore, in a causal explanation of how the agent acquired his true 
belief, it will be impossible to disentangle the agent’s training and skill of 
using the artifact from his actual engagement with it. 23  
 But even if such decomposition were possible, notice in addition that 
the part of the process that allows the agent to detect the truth, or in other 
words to be sensitive to the facts, is the external component. To illustrate this, 
consider, on one hand, an untrained agent in possession of a properly 
working artifact. In that case, it is obvious that even though the agent will 
initially be unable to form any (true or false) beliefs, eventually—provided 
that he gains sufficient experience such that he can interact with it—not only 
will he form beliefs, but he will also reliably enjoy cognitive success. On the 
other hand, think about a well-trained agent, but in possession of a faulty 
artifact. In this case, despite the agent’s excellent internal skills, it is evident 
that he would be unable to reach any (non-lucky) true beliefs, no matter how 
much he tried. It therefore seems that in such cases the most (and maybe the 
only) significant factor that explains the truth-status of the agent’s belief is the 
epistemic artifact. In other words, since the agent’s belief is true in virtue of 
the artifact, the virtue reliabilist must account for it being part of the agent’s 
cognitive system. Given, however, that cognition is normally supposed to 
take place within the agent’s head, virtue reliabilists can only account for such 
cases by wedding their view to the hypothesis of extended cognition. 
Accordingly, combining the extended cognition hypothesis with virtue 
reliabilism on the basis of their close fit does not seem to be just an available 
option for epistemologists, but also necessary for dealing with advanced cases 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 It should be here noted that not every case of the employment of an artifact is a case of 
cognitive extension, but only when the agent mutually interacts with it. For an objective 
criterion of constitution and on what may count as a genuine case of cognitive extension, see 
(Palermos 2014).   
23 Remember that according to virtue reliabilism and the underlying ability intuition on 
knowledge, knowledge is belief that is true in virtue of cognitive ability, where, according to 
Greco, “in virtue of” must be understood in causal explanatory terms. Even though several 
proponents of virtue reliabilism agree on this general causal-explanatory understanding of 
the view, there is disagreement on whether the relevant cognitive ability should be the “most 
salient” (Greco 2010) or merely a “significant” (Pritchard 2010b) factor in the causal 
explanation of how the agent acquired his true belief. 
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of knowledge where the latter is the product of the employment of epistemic 
artifacts that the agent mutually interacts with.  
 Apart from the necessity of introducing the extended cognition 
hypothesis within epistemology, however, this move can also generate 
interesting ramifications, especially for social epistemology. For instance, it 
can lead to the further claim that there could be cognitive characters that do 
not just extend beyond an agent’s organismic capacities, but which are 
instead distributed amongst several agents along with their epistemic artifacts. 
The hypothesis of distributed cognition, which has been developed in parallel 
to the hypothesis of extended cognition (Hutchins 1995 , Theiner et al. 2010, 
Sutton et al. 2008, Wilson 2005, Heylighen et al. 2007), differs to the latter 
position only in that this time the cognitive system extends to include 
epistemic artifacts as well as other agents. And interestingly, most proponents 
of the view (Sutton et al. 2008, Theiner et al. 2010, Wegner 1985, Tollefsen & 
Dale 2011) point out again that it is the existence of non-linear cooperative 
interactions between the contributing members and their artifacts that is the 
criterion by which we can judge whether we have an integrated distributed 
cognitive system. Accordingly, there could be knowledge-conducive cognitive 
characters, which may nevertheless be distributed.  
This is an interesting possibility, because it can allow us to combine an 
individualistic approach to knowledge, such as virtue reliabilism, with the 
hypothesis of distributed cognition in order to account for epistemic group 
agents: Groups of individuals who exist and gain knowledge in virtue of a 
shared, common cognitive character that mainly consists of a distributed 
cognitive ability—a collective cognitive ability that emerges out of the 
members’ mutual (socio-epistemic) interactions and which is not reducible to 
the cognitive abilities possessed by the individual members, thereby allowing 
us to speak of a group agent in itself. This is important, because by 
recognizing a group of people as a self-standing agent in itself, we can then 
use an individualistic approach to knowledge to account for knowledge that 
is collectively produced and which is, thereby, distinctively social. In other 
words we can make sense of the claim that p is known by S (the group agent), 
even though it is not known by any individual alone.24 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 For a more detailed explanation of how virtue reliabilism may be applied to epistemic 
group agents see (Palermos & Pritchard 2013).  
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 Remarkably, such group agents have already started being studied 
within cognitive science. Consider for example transactive memory systems 
(TMSs)—i.e., groups of two or more individuals who collaboratively encode, 
store and retrieve information. The reason why TMSs are good candidates for 
distributed cognitive systems—and thereby for epistemic group agents—is 
that, as Sutton et al. observe (2008), such systems are likely to involve skillful 
interactive simultaneous coordination of people who can thereby count as a 
single integrated cognitive system. Therefore, we can use TMSs in order to 
“conceptualize how people in close relationships may depend on each other 
for acquiring, remembering, and generating knowledge” (Wegner et al. 1985, 
253): 
 
Ordinarily psychologists think of memory as an individual’s store of 
knowledge, along with the processes whereby that knowledge is constructed, 
organized, and accessed. […] With transactive memory we are concerned 
with how knowledge enters the dyad, is organized within it, and is made 
available for subsequent use by it (ibid., 256). 
 
Apart from incorporating already existing research from cognitive 
science, however, the combination of virtue reliabilism with the hypotheses of 
extended and distributed cognition can generate new avenues for research, 
some of which have for a long time been inaccessible.  An interesting example 
is the intersection between epistemology and the field of history and 
philosophy of science. These two intimately related fields have so far been at 
odds—an awkward situation owing to the fact that the former discipline has 
traditionally being individualistic whereas the latter has for the most part 
been socially oriented (hardly anyone could deny the social nature of the 
scientific process, especially after the publication of Kuhn’s The Structure of the 
Scientific Revolutions, in 1962). The present approach, however, could now 
provide a useful link between the two fields. Science is primarily performed 
by individual scientists employing their hardware and software epistemic 
artifacts or by research teams operating within scientific labs that are uniquely 
tailored to fit their purposes. Accordingly, the concepts of extended cognitive 
characters and epistemic group agents could become very handy for a 
mainstream epistemological analysis of the scientific progress. As Giere and 
Moffat (2003, 308) note in their discussion of the scientific revolution of the 
16th century, 
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“No ‘new man’ suddenly emerged sometime in the sixteenth century....The 
idea that a more rational mind...emerged from darkness and chaos is too 
complicated a hypothesis” [Latour 1986, 1]. We agree completely. Appeals to 
cognitive architecture and capacities now studied in cognitive sciences are 
meant to explain how humans with normal human cognitive capacities 
manage to do modern science. One way, we suggest, is by constructing 
distributed cognitive systems that can be operated by humans possessing 
only the limited cognitive capacities they in fact possess. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
The topic of cognitive integration is a far-reaching multidisciplinary theme 
that touches upon a wide range of disparate questions with the potential of 
bringing several research areas together. Within epistemology, the 
phenomenon of cognitive integration can reveal how knowers may be 
subjectively justified despite the absence of positive reasons in favor of their 
true beliefs, pointing towards a minimalist yet informative epistemic norm: 
provided that one’s belief-forming process has been integrated into one’s 
cognitive system/character and that one is motivated to believe what is true, 
one can be justified in holding the resulting belief merely by lacking any 
doubts that his way of forming his belief, or that the belief itself, is 
inappropriate. Within philosophy of mind, cognitive integration can explain 
how it is possible to extend our cognitive capacities beyond our organisms to 
the artifacts we employ or other individuals we may interact with. And 
combining philosophy of mind with epistemology by using the process of 
cognitive integration as the connecting point provides the necessary means to 
account for advanced cases of knowledge where the known belief is true in 
virtue of the operation of epistemic artifacts or even the activity of 
collaborative groups. Quite likely, however, such an account of knowledge 
won’t be valuable just within epistemology, philosophy of mind and their 
intersection. Focusing on the essentially technological and collaborative 
nature of the scientific process, such an approach to knowledge could finally 
provide a strong link between the related but so far persistently isolated fields 
of philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and epistemology. 
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